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Introduction
Contrary to what is often assumed, insecurity in 
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) is not limited to rural areas marked by the 
presence of armed groups and military operations. 
Cities and towns in the region are subject to 
rampant criminality, including armed robbery, 
murders, burglary and kidnappings for ransom. 
Other, less visible, forms of everyday urban 
insecurity also abound, including extortion by state 
security services and local authorities.
Key points 
•	 In	numerous	cities	in	the	eastern	Congo,	
youth	groups	are	involved	in	urban	policing,	
operating	in	the	space	between	state	and	
non-state	actors	and	formal	and	informal	
governance.
•	 While	some	youth	policing	groups	are	
responsible	for	improvements	in	security	in	
their	neighbourhoods,	others	play	a	role	in	the	
deterioration	of	the	local	security	environment.
•	 These	groups	may,	at	times,	be	co-opted	or	
employed	by	state	security	actors,	criminal	
organizations	or	politicians.	This	can	affect	
their	status	and	contribution	to	security.
•	 The	organization	and	activities	of	these	
groups	vary	significantly	across	different	cities	
and	neighbourhoods.	These	features	also	
change	over	time,	reflecting	how	the	groups	
are	shaped	by	broader	political	and	security	
processes.
•	 Youth	policing	groups	are	not	simply	security	
actors.	Youth	engage	with	them	more	
broadly	to	shape	the	social	order	of	their	
neighbourhood	and	city,	rendering	themselves	
socially	and	politically	significant.
•	 The	groups	should	not	be	romanticized	as	
being	necessarily	more	legitimate	auxiliaries	
of,	or	alternatives	to,	state	security	forces.	
They	have	an	inherently	ambiguous	and	fluid	
character,	which	cautions	against	including	
them	in	donor	programming.
•	 The	resources	and	status	provided	by	inclusion	
in	donor-sponsored	programmes	are	likely	to	
alter	the	stakes	of	involvement	in	these	groups,	
and	spark	increased	conflict,	with	uncertain	
outcomes.
SAJECEK-Forces vives office in Bukavu, DRC, 2019.
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State security services have largely failed to improve 
urban security, despite some occasional short-lived 
successes. Certain groups within the security services 
are even suspected of being involved in banditry 
themselves—allegedly protecting and collaborating with 
criminals, including by providing them with arms.
Against this backdrop, urban youth have become 
involved in everyday policing and practices of order-
making—the making, maintaining and transforming of 
social order.1 groups of (mostly male) youth—defined as 
being roughly between 14 and 40 years of age—patrol 
the streets at night, guard markets and other public 
spaces, pursue, catch and punish suspected criminals, 
and try to retrieve stolen goods. These groups, and 
the activities that they undertake, differ between 
neighbourhoods and cities.
Some youth policing groups may contribute to 
improvements in security, while others are believed to 
foster greater insecurity. They sometimes collaborate 
with state security forces, and sometimes do not. They 
create forms of security that are on the one hand public, 
benefiting everyone, and on the other hand, private, 
delivering a service only for those who are able to pay. 
While some of these groups are highly appreciated by 
the inhabitants of the quarters in which they operate, 
others are feared or may be associated with criminal 
activities.
Based on fieldwork carried out between 2015 and 2019, 
this briefing examines the structure, operations and 
social function of youth policing groups in three cities in 
the eastern Congo: the Forces vives in Bukavu, the Anti-
gang in goma and the Balala rondo in uvira. in each 
of these cities, there are many other youth groups and 
associations involved in policing-like activities whose 
existence is often more fleeting. This study focuses on 
groups that have made a strong and enduring imprint on 
the urban security landscape.
There is a growing drive by donors to include non-
state actors, such as youth policing groups, within 
programmes to improve security governance. Providing 
support for what is known as multilayered security 
governance has been suggested as an alternative 
to state-centered, top-down security sector reform 
initiatives.2 
Our findings caution against embracing youth policing 
groups in donor-funded initiatives.3 These groups can 
contribute both to improved security and greater 
insecurity, depending on often rapidly shifting local 
political and security dynamics. Any decision to work 
with or support youth policing groups will become an 
additional variable in these shifting dynamics, with 
uncertain outcomes.
Background
The involvement of youth in urban policing and order-
making in the Congo is not a new phenomenon. During 
the era of President mobutu (1965–1997), the youth 
wing of the Mouvement populaire de la révolution 
(mPR, Popular movement of the Revolution), the 
country’s sole political party, maintained what was 
called a Disciplinary Brigade. in some areas, the group 
collaborated with the local security services in carrying 
out night-time patrols. However, it was also reported to 
carry out arbitrary arrests, primarily for the purpose of 
extortion, and impose illegal fines on citizens.4
in the 1990s, new forms of youth involvement in 
policing emerged. After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 
hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees, mixed 
with government soldiers and militia members, fled 
to eastern Zaire (now Congo). in the refugee camps, 
these groups recreated pre-existing political and military 
structures and established patrols to maintain security. 
inhabitants of the suburbs of Bukavu and goma, near 
where refugee camps were located, worried about the 
activities of these armed patrols. in response, Congolese 
youth organized neighbourhood watches and patrolled 
the streets at night.
in 1996, the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la 
libération du Congo/Zaïre (AFDL, Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire)—backed by 
Rwanda and other African countries—invaded eastern 
Zaire. The perceived foreign character of the rebellion 
prompted some urban youth who were already involved 
in patrolling to join rural groups fighting the AFDL 
later known as Mai-Mai, while others joined urban 
criminal gangs. in 1998, the Rwanda and uganda-backed 
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD, 
Congolese Rally for Democracy), started a rebellion 
and occupied eastern Congo’s main cities, which 
caused urban insecurity to reach new heights. it also 
changed in character, with a rise in armed and violent 
robberies. To combat this insecurity, many young 
people again became involved in patrolling, which was 
encouraged by the RCD’s security services. in Bukavu, 
these patrols were often organized by chefs de quartier 
(neighbourhood authorities), who referred to these 
units as their milices (militias).5
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Since the formal end of the Congo Wars in 2003, youth 
policing groups have periodically resurfaced in big 
cities under different names. in uvira, there are night-
patrol groups called Balala rondo—the name coming 
from the Swahili word kulala (to sleep) and the French 
word ronde (patrol). These groups are organized by 
neighbourhood and work closely with local authorities, 
in particular chefs de quartier and chefs d’avenue 
(avenue authorities).
in 2011, in an effort to combat rising insecurity in uvira, 
the new administrator of uvira territory allowed the 
groups to operate in partnership with formal authorities. 
Subsequent urban authorities and security services have 
shown less enthusiasm for this approach. After uvira 
was besieged by a rebel coalition led by the mai-mai 
Yakutumba in September 2017, Balala rondo groups 
were suspected of being infiltrated by, or working for 
the mai-mai, which resulted in their suspension. With 
urban insecurity on the rise again, the groups have 
recently resurfaced in numerous quarters, operating 
under an unclear statute.
goma is the home of youth policing groups referred to 
as Anti-gang.6 The first Anti-gang was founded to protect 
the market of Virunga against maibobo (street children) 
in 2007 when violence and crime were on the rise. The 
mayor at the time, Polydore Wundi, backed the Anti-
gang, which was initiated by a Maître (master) amongst 
so-called sportifs (those trained in the martial arts). 
Wundi also provided them with service cards, which 
state that they are a member of the group.
The initiative was a success, and in October 2008, the 
mayor’s successor, Roger Tumbula, authorized the Anti-
gang to operate throughout the city. They were required 
to report to the mayor, and collaborate with the Police 
nationale congolaise (PNC, Congolese National Police). 
The formalization of the Anti-gang’s activities was 
disliked by some police and intelligence officials, who 
accused Tumbula of using the Anti-gang as his own 
private militia. in June 2010, after Tumbula stepped 
down as mayor, the Anti-gang were suspended. While 
they have not disappeared, the form and intensity of 
their activities have fluctuated ever since. 
in Bukavu, rampant insecurity proliferated after the 
Second Congo War formally ended in 2003. Youth gangs 
brutalized inhabitants, particularly in the neighbourhood 
known as Essence. The police and army were unable to 
effectively tackle the situation. Both were also accused 
of collaborating with the criminals. As a consequence, 
some of Essence’s youth created their own policing 
units.
Around the time of the 2006 presidential election, 
a development organization called Synergie des 
associations des jeunes pour l’éducation civique et 
électorale et la promotion des droits de l’homme au 
Sud-Kivu (SAJECEK, Synergy of Youth Associations for 
Civic and Electoral Education and the Promotion of 
Human Rights in South-Kivu) absorbed some of these 
loosely organized movements into its newly created 
security branch, renaming itself SAJECEK Essence-Forces 
vives. Facing what its leaders perceived as an absence of 
state security services, the branch’s initial aims were to 
fight crime and put an end to widespread mob justice. 
Roughly three years later, the organization split into two 
associations, today known as SAJECEK-Forces vives and 
Bukavu-Forces vives, both formally registered as not-for-
profit associations.
As this short historical overview shows, youth policing 
groups in each city have a distinct history and evolution, 
which has resulted in differences in their organization, 
status and activities. These elements, which also vary 
over time and by neighbourhood, shape the ways these 
groups engage in order-making, including their impact 
on the local security situation.  
Order-making 
urban youth policing groups commonly self-identify 
and are widely seen as engaging in autoprise en charge 
(taking care of oneself) in the domain of security. This 
discourse has its roots in the mobutu era, when public 
service provision was severely eroded and citizens 
started their own initiatives to compensate for a barely 
functioning state.
The groups are not merely security actors. They are 
engaged in a more complex process that serves to 
shape the social order of their neighbourhood and city. 
Their objective is often not solely to improve security, 
and sometimes security is not their main interest at all. 
Frequently, they seek to render themselves socially and 
politically significant. many young people participate 
in these groups to gain a sense of social and political 
agency in a context where they have very limited 
influence on formal politics and decision-making.
Order-making often includes activities that are related 
to improving security. For example, in uvira, a crucial 
activity for the Balala rondo is night-time patrolling, 
armed with torches, sticks, vuvuzelas, cell phones, 
whistles and sometimes machetes. The patrols, which 
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often catch thieves and hand them over to the military 
and the police, have become quite popular. many 
people believe that as ‘children of the neighbourhood’, 
the Balala rondo make a greater contribution to 
improving security than the state security services. The 
latter are often portrayed as bageni (strangers) and are 
seen as caring less about the safety of the population 
than the Balala rondo.
in Bukavu, both versions of the Forces vives play a key 
role in the security of the neighbourhoods where they 
operate. They do this either by confronting thieves on 
their own or by becoming an informal extension of 
the state security apparatus, helping police and courts 
to identify and catch criminals. They also locate and 
retrieve stolen goods, which they return to their owners 
for a fee. Reflecting their character as an NgO, SAJECEK-
Forces vives also engages in advocacy on security-
related issues and runs community development 
projects and campaigns about sexual violence.
The Anti-gang in goma guard certain public spaces, such 
as markets, and provide protection to people bothered 
by maibobo and street gangs. Like the Forces vives in 
Bukavu, the Anti-gang retrieve stolen goods in exchange 
for a small fee. They also carry out small jobs for the 
municipal authorities and state security services, such 
as looking for wanted persons, evicting illegal markets 
or providing security muscle at public demonstrations. 
Anti-gang are generally armed with nunchakus—a 
martial arts weapon consisting of two short sticks 
connected by a rope or chain—reflecting their status as 
sportifs trained in boxing, judo or Shotokan (a style of 
karate).
Youth policing groups have sometimes used significant 
violence in their efforts to apprehend suspected 
criminals. in the early days of youth mobilization in 
Bukavu’s Essence neighbourhood, the Forces vives 
would publicly flog suspects. These public performances 
sometimes resulted in serious injuries and, in rare 
cases, accidental death.7 Similarly, in its early years 
(until around 2010), the Anti-gang in goma engaged 
in a practice called Chapitre 7 (Chapter 7). This refers 
to the mandate of the united Nations mission in the 
Congo, which permits the use of force in fulfillment of 
the mission’s mandate. Chapitre 7 entailed the public 
punishment of suspects by dragging them through 
mud and beating them up, while trying to avoid serious 
injuries.8
The practice of public punishment is not new. During 
the mobutu era, as well as the colonial period, criminals 
sentenced to death were hanged in Bukavu’s main 
square. under mobutu’s successor, Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila (1997–2001), criminals and abusive soldiers alike 
were also summarily executed there.
Some of today’s urban inhabitants look back upon 
these practices with nostalgia. Due to the dysfunction 
of the current justice and penitentiary systems, 
many perpetrators pay their way out of jail or simply 
escape. in contrast, public executions put an end to 
criminals’ activities once and for all. While stopping 
short of killing, the past use of public punishment by 
youth policing groups taps into the popular belief that 
severe punishments are needed to end crime. it has 
consequently helped these groups to gain a degree of 
popular legitimacy.
The aversion of youth policing groups for killing suspects 
means that they often try to stop forms of justice 
populaire (mob justice)—incidents where citizens 
try to kill a suspected criminal or witch, generally by 
burning or stoning them to death.9 These events also 
risk undermining the authority of youth policing groups, 
since they involve forms of order-making that do not 
depend on their power. moreover, they undermine 
the authority of the state, which many youth policing 
groups claim to uphold. These groups sometimes 
position themselves as an extension of the state security 
services. As a leader of the Anti-gang put it: ‘it is good 
if we are recognized by the state, automatically we 
become an agency of the state’.10 Others, by contrast, do 
not consider themselves a part of the state, but rather 
see themselves as playing a role in improving how it 
works.
One similarity that youth policing groups have with state 
security services is that they sometimes get involved 
in criminal activity. This includes harassment of the 
population for the purpose of extortion, which one 
Anti-gang leader in goma saw as justified because, ‘we 
also are a security agency’.11 in addition to extortion, 
youth policing groups are suspected of collaborating 
with thieves, by providing detailed information on 
different areas and who owns valuable items there. 
Such collaboration also includes failing to denounce or 
hand over to the police known thieves, as this would 
undermine the groups’ business of retrieving stolen 
goods. Some groups, like the Anti-gang in goma, are 
also reported to be involved in trafficking cannabis.
Balala rondo groups in uvira have been accused of 
complicity with armed group networks, which they work 
for as informants or facilitate recruitment and political 
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mobilization activities. While most armed groups are 
located in the countryside, their networks extend into 
cities, in particular to areas situated on the urban 
periphery. According to one interviewee in uvira, in the 
neighbourhoods of Kasenga and Rugombe, Balala rondo 
maintain an ‘umbilical cord’ to mai-mai groups in the 
surrounding hills.12
Public and private interests
Youth policing groups require certain resources to 
operate effectively. These include batteries and pocket 
lights to conduct night patrols, hot meals for patrollers, 
and phone credit for communication. To obtain these 
resources, the groups have developed extensive systems 
for the collection of financial and in-kind contributions. 
in uvira, either the chef d’avenue or the Balala rondo 
themselves collect money and manioc or maize flour 
from house to house. They also solicit money, batteries 
and phone credit from market vendors, small shops and 
local businesses.
in Bukavu, both of the Forces vives groups receive 
financial contributions from members, sympathizers, 
grateful clients and political backers. A major source of 
income is derived from the recovery of stolen goods. 
Depending on the difficulty of the case, they ask for frais 
de recherche (research fees). if they manage to find a 
stolen item, the lucky owner will pay an additional fee 
that is commensurate with the value of the object, a 
cadeau de remerciement (gift of appreciation).13 This 
business model has become quite successful across 
Bukavu and several other youth groups now offer a 
similar service.
The Anti-gang in goma also generate income from 
retrieving stolen goods and collecting money from shops 
and businesses. in the Ndosho neighbourhood, these 
supposedly voluntary contributions came to be seen by 
business owners as tracasseries (harassment). When 
shopkeepers refused to pay, they were intimidated. in 
response, the déboutistes, a grassroots social movement 
in Ndosho, tracked down the Anti-gang and beat one of 
them up. Combined with the dwindling support supplied 
by the mayor and the police, Anti-gang activities in the 
neighbourhood subsequently declined.
Forced contributions become even more problematic 
when people suspect that they are being pocketed 
by the leaders of youth policing groups, or the urban 
authorities coordinating the collections. Whether 
this occurs largely depends on the general norms and 
morality of the groups’ leadership and of the urban 
authorities involved. Some show responsible leadership 
and monitor the behaviour of their members towards 
citizens, punishing them in case of wrong-doing. Others, 
by contrast, act in a more self-interested manner.
The risk of self-interested behaviour grows when more 
money is at stake. Wealthier individuals and businesses 
sometimes pay youth policing groups quite large sums, 
but in return they expect them to guard their homes 
and other installations. This occurs in uvira’s Kilibula 
neighbourhood, where an agent of a big trading 
company and the supervisor of the harbour used to 
pay the Balala rondo large sacks of beans and rice and 
around uSD 50-100 a month to guard their warehouses 
and homes. in goma, similar arrangements exist, with 
the Anti-gang being hired to guard ngandas (bars) in 
popular neighbourhoods. Such arrangements transform 
youth policing groups from providers of public to private 
security.
Efforts to harness youth policing groups for personal 
interest also inform donations by political actors. 
Some politicians contribute to these groups in order 
to be seen as do-gooders who care for the security of 
the population—a dynamic that may intensify during 
elections. Youth form a substantial part of the electorate 
and also hold additional political weight as the main 
organizers of demonstrations and roadblocks.
As a local official in uvira explained: ‘There are political 
interferences, people think that by taking responsibility 
for, by getting hold of these youths, they have a chance 
to pass the election…They have even created groups 
of youth pretending they are neighborhood groups, 
but in reality they are campaign committees, linked to 
politicians’.14
in goma too, certain political actors, particularly 
mayors, have sought to gain a hold on youth policing 
groups. This is partly because they felt that they had 
little influence over the urban police—who primarily 
respond to their own hierarchy—and lower-rank urban 
authorities. The Anti-gang, by contrast, may be more 
responsive to the mayor’s demands and can therefore 
be harnessed to push their political agenda.
Similar dynamics can be observed in Bukavu, where 
urban and provincial politicians understand the 
importance of Essence as a bastion of popular 
opinion and activism. Forces vives quickly established 
themselves as a leading voice there with the ability to 
shape local opinion. This has made their leaders targets 
of political manipulation.
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it would, however, be a mistake to see youth policing 
groups, which always maintain a significant level 
of autonomy, simply as the puppets of powerful 
authorities. Political manipulation goes both ways—
while politicians aim to gain a foothold in particular 
parts of town through their association with youth 
policing groups, their leaders often try to propel 
themselves into influential positions in politics or local 
administration.
Between formal and informal spheres
The status of youth policing groups depends on whether 
they are authorized and encouraged by local authorities 
to operate, or whether their activities are prohibited 
(and such prohibition is actively enforced). in the 
absence of national legislation, policies or directives 
surrounding non-state security providers come from 
local administrative and security authorities, such as city 
mayors and urban or provincial police chiefs. 
Local authorities have regularly changed their position 
towards youth policing groups, depending on their 
personal preferences, their political calculations and 
networks, and evolving security and political dynamics. 
The result is cycles of formalization and informalization.15
While some chiefs of security services have encouraged 
the actions of youth policing groups, many have been 
hesitant in working with them. A police officer in uvira 
explained:
The balala rondo is a phenomenon that we cannot 
approve of. A juridical base, do they have one? A 
functional base? And the theory? They only have the 
practice…This system has been created by whom? 
Who has asked these young people to patrol? And 
they report to whom? That’s the question. They are 
accountable to whom? There is no statute for these 
people, it works de facto.16
Youth policing groups and state security services 
display ambivalent attitudes towards each other. The 
army and police often rely on the groups, which have 
good knowledge of their local area and its criminal 
community, to help maintain security. A low-level urban 
authority in Bukavu explained: ‘At Essence, the Forces 
vives can do things the police cannot.’17
However, the groups may also be seen as an obstacle or 
threat to state security forces. First, the police may feel 
that the groups are doing their work more successfully 
than they do. This may earn youth policing groups 
more popular legitimacy than the police. Second, some 
police officers complain that the groups are too close 
to criminal networks and protect thieves instead of 
handing them over to the authorities. Third, where state 
security forces are involved in illegal activities, or the 
protection of people involved in them, the presence 
of youth policing groups may be a hindrance to their 
activities.
Youth policing groups, for their part, see state security 
forces in an equally ambivalent manner. On the one 
hand, they may appear to be imitating or copying 
certain police practices. For example, in goma, the Anti-
gang use terminology of the state armed forces such 
as état-major (general staff). They also often remove 
suspects’ shoes to deter them from running away—a 
practice learned by observing the police. Youth policing 
groups generally also want to collaborate with state 
security forces, which provides them with a degree of 
authority and increases the perception that they are 
formal entities.
On the other hand, youth policing groups tend to deeply 
dislike and distrust the state security forces due to their 
perceived incompetence, corruption and involvement in 
illegal activities. moreover, they often accuse the police 
of releasing the thieves that they have captured much 
too quickly.
This practice is seen as causing a security risk for the 
youth policing groups, as those who are released may 
seek to take revenge on the people who denounced and 
caught them. in Bukavu, a young woman with a close 
association to the Forces vives explained: ‘You will find 
thieves who tell us: “Even if you take us to prison, i will 
come back and will start with you.” immediately, you 
will be scared to denounce a thief.’18
Policy considerations 
urban youth policing groups can be difficult to 
categorize and display different features across cities, 
neighbourhoods and over time. They are neither fully 
formal, nor completely informal; they mimic certain 
elements of official security services, but also have 
characteristics that differ significantly from these; 
they hover between the public and private spheres; 
and they are connected with both improvements and 
deterioration in the urban security environment.
The changing nature of youth policing groups makes 
their incorporation into donor-sponsored initiatives 
inherently risky. The behaviour of these groups, which 
may at times be constructive or helpful towards donor-
supported security agendas, cannot be guaranteed 
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in the future. Changes in leadership of these groups, 
or among the authorities who back them, may have 
profound effects on their behaviour and activities. 
They may rapidly morph into criminal gangs, tools for 
the enrichment of powerful individuals or political 
mobilizers.
The increased financial resources and status that comes 
with participating in donor-funded initiatives may 
feed into conflicts and competition within the groups’ 
leadership. it may also foster jealousy among state 
security forces, with whom they already have difficult 
relations.
in addition, access to external funds can make these 
groups immune to changes in the local security 
context. Therefore, they may persist when, from a 
security point of view, their existence may no longer 
be needed or be counter-productive. When making a 
positive contribution to security, the groups’ continuing 
existence can also reduce incentives to further improve 
the functioning of the state security services.
Efforts by Congolese authorities to regulate youth 
policing groups have had mixed results. in uvira, the 
chef de cité (town chief) stipulated in 2011 that all 
Balala rondo must be registered by chefs de quartiers 
and that the lists be submitted to the town hall. Rules 
for recruitment were also established, including the 
exclusion of minors from the groups. members were 
supposed to be well-known in the community and to 
have good morals.  
These criteria were listed in a protocol that each chef 
de quartier and Balala rondo president was asked to 
sign. However, Balala rondo presidents often allowed 
unregistered individuals, including minors, to participate 
in patrols.
initiatives to provide these groups with cards or 
badges have not been very successful either. A rapidly 
changing membership, as well as the fact that the cards 
and badges were easily lost or sold, meant that many 
patrollers ended up without either.
An alternative method of regulating youth policing 
groups is to absorb them into existing civil society 
organizations (as happened in Bukavu). This could 
regulate the groups’ more violent practices while 
simultaneously allowing their members to engage in 
community development projects.
Yet, it is unclear how the more ad-hoc operating groups, 
such as the Balala rondo, would react to such a high 
degree of institutionalization, and the increased control, 
bureaucracy and fees that come with it. it is precisely in 
being semi-regulated and semi-official that these groups 
can be efficient and powerful. 19 For instance, not being 
bound by strict rules and supervision renders the groups 
useful for political actors, who in turn provide them with 
income and influence.
Regardless of how these groups are regulated, it seems 
important to provide members of youth policing groups 
with civic education and training in human rights. Yet 
paradoxically, less violent behaviour may cause them to 
lose popularity, particularly as they may consequently 
be seen as being less effective. This, in turn, can create 
space for the emergence of unregulated and more 
violent groups, as has occurred in Bukavu, where some 
groups have begun violently punishing suspected 
criminals.
A member of one of these groups—Pomba solution—
explained: ‘Even if you reproach a child with mere 
words, they will never listen, but if you use the whip, 
they will easily understand.’20 These developments show 
the complex role of violence in processes of legitimation 
and de-legitimation.
ultimately, how to deal with and regulate youth 
policing groups is a question that has to be addressed 
by Congolese authorities and civil society. History 
has shown that, in the absence of an effective state, 
Congolese youth will come together to engage in 
alternative forms of urban order-making.
Contrary to romanticizing youth initiatives as an 
effective grassroots response to an inefficient and 
corrupt state, it should be acknowledged that they are 
inherently complex and ambiguous. in this, they are no 
different from the Congolese state, and, for that matter, 
Congolese society at large.
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